Based on the legal context surrounding Cecile Ferguson’s case, the appellate court will reverse the decision convicting her of second-degree murder due to substantially inadequate evidence. In this case, the court did not suffice the legal threshold to prove the application of second-degree murder, and consequently convict Cecile Ferguson. According to the McKinney’s Penal Law § 125.25 and § 125.25, a person if guilty of second murder crime if under various material time of the claimed defender’s recklessness, the murder amounts to second class degree in a class A-I felony, or in the event of alleged defender’s recklessness leading to a commission of murder, the prevailing circumstances evinced to a deprived indifferences to human life, and it is proved that the defendant recklessly engaged in the conduct which created a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causing untimely death to the deceased. There are the two governing rules that determine a conviction of one to second-degree murder. Indeed, either of the rules must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the situation of the case must fully meet the condition of second-degree murder as alleged by the plaintiffs.
These two governing rules are embodied in some specific rules that determine cases fronted under second-degree murder. Therefore, a conviction to an offender must take cognizance of the specific cases applicable to the general principles. The specific cases on defendant’s Miranda rights are resolvable of the court of appeal against instigating an arbitrary conviction of the defendant without considering his or her rights in the case.
The proof for depraved indifference is one fundament of second-degree murder. Considering the case between the Peoples of the State of New York, Respondent vs. Angelo Esposito, (Appellant), the appeal court help the defendant of a second-degree murder owing to the prevailing legal contexts under this case. According to the court, the defendant violated the legal provision which was devoid of considering sanctity of life, and thus this case meeting the provisions under depraved indifference. The county court convicted the appellant of various counts of murder; conviction of murder in the second degree, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree, attempted assaults in the second degree, tampering with physical evidence, two counts of harassment, and based on the country court, the appellant should have been confirmed guilty of second degree murder and this amount to substantial proof of depraved indifference to human life. According to the verdict by the court (People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), the appellant was found guilty of second-degree murder and all counts of charges. The reasons provide by the county court were undisputable and proved existence of reckless beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant’s case evinced a depraved indifference to human life. Therefore, the county’s counts of charges were sufficiently instigated and viable charged the defendant of second-degree murder due to the unfolding evocations of the case. In addition, the courts verdict confirms degree of conviction according to the New York penal law, § 125.25.
The second case involving “the People of the State of the New York and Derrick Williams, the appellant, found substantial evidence to convict the appellant of all charges leveled against him by the court. The court of appeal upheld lower court’s and indeed found that the appellant was guilty of second-degree murder, and subsequently his conducts evinced a depraved indifference since it disregarded human life. The defendant after sideswiping one car, led police to high-speed chases over several blocks, while sideswiping other cars before causing a tragic accident and hitting a decedent and dragging him for a 35 feet. Despite, this reckless move, the driver drove recklessly hitting another bus before fleeing on foot. During this horrific incidence, the defendant ran several red lights and stopped signs and failed to honk at his horn. The court of appeal acknowledged the rulings of the lower courts and reprimanded the defendant of a second-degree murder, since he was he fraudulently conducted himself thus violating section § 125.25 that governs such cases.
Based on the fundamental guidelines under the New York Penal laws § 125.25, Cecile Ferguson should not have been held liable against second-degree murder. In the context of Ferguson’s case, her actions did not evince indifference to human life. The following accounts hold valid for her and this disregard any formal complaint to convict her of second-degree murder. In the preceding cases, one is liable against second-degree murder if his or her case merits two conditions. However, neither the conduction was served in the incidence leading to Ferguson’s charges nor besides she is fully entitled to her Miranda rights. Evidence that could be staged against the defendant does not merit the legal threshold that convicts a person of the second-degree murder. It is imperative to note that Ferguson drove at an exceeding mileage though this did not amount to any carelessness. Indeed, any suit brought on the account of carelessness will not succeed since the defendant did everything within his rights to protect the life of the deceased. In addition, the extra mileage of drive is not any reason to go by when proving facts about second murder charges.
Instances of negligence can be tolerated in this case but would not give substantial evidence against the defendant. For instance, the accident was caused by the poor state of the road, which Cecile was not in control. In addition, this accident resulted as a collateral damage to the unintentional situation, and the defendant was cushioned from second murder crime due to the prevalence of his Miranda rights. The resultant case here would only amount to the accident since no charges of evinced indifference to human life could be sustained. In response to this condition, neither Ferguson’s nor her friends had intended to cause this accident or murder, and at the material time of the occurrence of this incidence, no justification to recklessness by the defendant could be proved. In addition, Ferguson surrendered to the police and thus justifying that her alleged crime did not amount to felony of the aforementioned category.
Regarding this case, there is enough evidence to acquit Ferguson off charges of second degree murder, as the prevailing counts of the case clearly indicates her innocence of the aforementioned charges. From the presiding contextual cases, it is worth noting that the two victims were held liable for a second degree murder since their conducts evinced a depraved indifference to human life. This situation is untrue to the case involving Ferguson, who has been controversy, linked to the death of a Nissan driver, and consequently charged of second degree murder. Convicting Ferguson of second degree murder is a thus a violation of New York Penal laws § 125.25, since it does not merit legal standings attributed to such charges.
McKinney’s Penal Law § 125.25 § 125.25 Murder in the second degree
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Derrick WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant. June 25, 1992.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York. The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,v.Jon Paul LAZARTES, appellant. Nov. 7, 2005.
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Angelo Esposito, Appellant. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York (June 5, 1995)